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I. Introduction 
Vaccines can provide an extremely cost-effective technology for dealing with infectious diseases, 
saving lives and averting millions of dollars of potential health expenditures.1 But the supply of pediatric 
vaccines in the US appears precarious, with a declining number of producers and products. In 1967 there 
were 26 licensed manufacturers, but only 12 in 2002. Five firms produce almost all routine childhood 
vaccines, with a sole supplier for five of the eight recommended pediatric vaccines.2 When key suppliers 
experience manufacturing problems, supply interruptions and vaccine shortages interrupt immunization 
schedules, sometimes leading to children not being immunized. For flu vaccine, supply shortages during 
the narrow annual window for effective administration have posed risks to vulnerable populations.  
Not all is gloom and doom in the vaccine business, however. Historically, entry of firms and 
products has been rapid when scientific advance creates new opportunities. Global vaccine sales doubled 
during the 1990s, from $2.9b. in 1992 to over $6b. in 2000, 3 although global sales of basic vaccines 
dropped 40% over the same period.4 Global vaccine sales increased 16 percent from 2008-2009, reaching 
$22.1b.5  This growth reflects new pediatric products, including varicella, rotovirus and childhood 
pneumococcal vaccines, in addition to travel and adult vaccines, including a cervical cancer vaccine and 
new vaccine combinations. Vaccine manufacturers spend about 16 percent of sales on R&D, a 
comparable ratio to the pharmaceutical industry. Some large pharmaceutical companies have recently 
entered the vaccine industry through acquisition (for example, Pfizer’s $68b. purchase of Wyeth was 
partly for its vaccine business; Novartis acquired Chiron, Abbott purchased Solvay), and several biotech 
firms have entered in the US and other countries. Thus precarious supply of existing vaccines co-exists 
with healthy entry to produce new vaccines. 
The industrial organization literature has proposed general models of entry and exit to an industry 
(Caves, 1998). Entry has been modeled to reflect such factors as entry barriers, whether set-up costs are 
retrievable or “sunk”, potential entry and exit of competitors, the extent of product substitutability etc. 
Theories of withdrawal from markets include some of the same but also some different explanations, 
such as intrafirm cannibalization or interfirm competition in multiproduct competition settings (Ruebeck, 
2005), declining demand (Ghemawat and Nalebuff 1985, 1990), age of the firm, firm size, and industry-
specific characteristics, such as the extent of scale economies, the dynamics of the demand and 
knowledge conditions. Entry and exit have also been modeled as interrelated phenomena, with authors 
finding a high correlation between average entry and exit rates, across time and within industries, 
supporting the incorporation of entry as a determinant of exit and vice-versa (Carree and Thurik, 1996; 
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Disney et al., 2003; Dunne et al., 1988). The dynamic processes governing an industry’s structure include 
learning effects, both by producers (Jovanovic, 1982) and consumers, replacement and displacement 
effects (Carree and Thurik, 1996), and the emergence of a dominant design. Studies also examine levels 
of market concentration and its consequences for welfare. For example, industries with a low flow of 
entry and exit may have limited innovativeness and some form of formal or tacit collusion (Geroski and 
Jacquemin, 1985); on the other hand, a continuous change of competitors may be socially inefficient, 
particularly in activities with significant investment of capital, time and knowledge. 
This paper focuses on exit from (and to a lesser extent entry to) the vaccine industry from 1903 to 
2005. We draw on some of the factors considered in the general industrial organization literature but also 
factors specific to vaccines. Compared to most industries (but similar to other pharmaceuticals), the 
vaccine industry is highly R&D intensive and heavily regulated, in the US by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and by similar authorities in other countries, with high regulatory costs of entry 
and continued operations. However, unlike most other pharmaceuticals in the US, vaccines also face 
government as a significant customer, at least for the pediatric vaccines that are recommended by the US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Previous economic analyses of the vaccine industry 
have focused on the role of government procurement in general -- and government price setting in 
particular -- in making vaccine markets less attractive than markets for other pharmaceuticals. Liability 
risks have also allegedly made vaccines unattractive.  
We posit that exogenous advances in basic science create the potential to produce new and/or 
improved vaccines against specific diseases such as hepatitis B, rotovirus etc. Following such a 
knowledge shock, several firms may engage in R&D to apply this knowledge to produce a vaccine 
product. This R&D race may result in several, slightly differentiated products that meet regulatory 
requirements for safety and efficacy entering the market at different times. Even if one product has been 
approved, other firms may rationally continue with their clinical trials, given the ex ante risks associated 
with regulatory approval and market acceptance and the fact that significant research costs may already 
be sunk. We document but do not model this entry process.  
Our model of vaccine exits posits that, for a given technology, the vaccine production process 
is subject to non-increasing costs over a range that may suffice to serve the entire US market. For public 
and private purchasers, the cross-price elasticity of demand between substitutable products is high and 
purchasing is structured such that firms adopt non-cooperative, Bertrand pricing strategies. If multiple 
firms enter the market with close substitutable products and each faces low and non-increasing marginal 
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cost up to the scale of the market, non-cooperative pricing implies that prices could potentially fall to 
marginal cost. This creates pressures for all but one product to eventually exit. Products that have higher 
marginal costs, shocks to fixed costs (such as the need to build new plants) or less desirable safety, 
efficacy or convenience attributes for consumers are more likely to exit. Prices for the surviving 
product(s) may nevertheless be constrained by contestability from foreign or previous entrants and/or 
monopsony power of purchasers, with the relative importance of these factors differing across vaccine 
types.  
In this model, new product entry to a vaccine type usually occurs in waves, following 
technological or market changes. Exits are triggered by quality and potential price competition, including 
dynamic entry of superior products, and by regulatory or other shocks that raise costs of incumbent firms 
or reduce demand. In this model, government procurement as practiced by the CDC reduces prices 
primarily by exacerbating competition by design of the bidding process, not because the government 
imposes price regulation. On the other hand, government involvement through vaccine recommendations 
and mandates increases quantity demanded, and hence may increase the expected number of 
products/firms in a market, cet. par. Given these offsetting effects of government on price and volume, 
the net effect of government involvement on number of suppliers or vaccine exit is theoretically 
ambiguous and must be determined empirically.  
Our empirical analysis tests these hypotheses related to vaccine exit using data on vaccine license 
terminations between 1901 and 2003. The results confirm that the hazard of exit increases with number 
of competitors and is more likely following the entry of new competitors, whereas sole suppliers are less 
likely to exit. We find that over time, the vaccine industry has become much more demanding and exit 
propensities increased after the mid 1960s, which may reflect several factors: higher FDA safety, efficacy 
and manufacturing quality requirements following the 1962 Amendments to the FDA Act; increased risk 
of strict tort liability after the 1966 Second Restatement of Torts; and possibly increasing government 
purchase of some vaccines after the mid 1960s. Correlation between these three trends precludes 
indentifying their separate effects. However, we do not find support for the common assertion that price 
regulation by the CDC or its share of volume purchased has contributed to vaccine exit, plausibly 
because these effects are offsetting. This finding, that government purchase on balance has no negative 
effect on firms’ willingness to remain in the market, is consistent with the theoretical prediction, that 
competitive markets would likely lead to one or very few suppliers in the long run, given the cost 
structure of vaccine supply, the relatively small market compared to many pharmaceuticals and limited 
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storability of most vaccines. This finding is also consistent with casual evidence that vaccine producers in 
fact seek out government recommendation and purchase of their vaccines.6  
 Section II of the paper describes previous related literature. Section III outlines our model of 
vaccine supply and market equilibrium. Section IV describes the data and methods. Section V provides 
descriptive evidence on vaccine entry and exits. Section V reports hazard model estimates of exit for 
individual vaccine products (licenses) and for vaccine producers. Section VI presents evidence on 
vaccine availability in Canada, France, Portugal and the UK, compared to the US, and Section VII 
provides a case study of the flu vaccine market in the US that illustrates the importance of high fixed 
costs and demand uncertainty.  
 
II. Previous Literature 
An extensive previous economic literature describes the institutional structure of vaccine supply 
and purchase, the economic case of mandatory vaccination, and appropriate subsidies for vaccine demand 
through reimbursement (see DeBrock, 1985; IOM, 2004). A more limited number of papers examine the 
effects of CDC procurement on prices and on vaccine shortages (e.g. Salkever and Frank, 1996). Kauf 
(1999) uses data from 1997-1992 on private catalog and federal contract prices for 3 vaccines (DTP, 
OPV and MMR) and 1988- 1992 for Hib and Hep B to test empirically whether the public discount 
percentage is more consistent with models of price discrimination or bargaining power. She concludes 
that, while it is not possible to eliminate other factors, results favor the bargaining power hypothesis. This 
conclusion is based primarily on finding a positive association between the public discount percent and 
the public share of volume. She does not explicitly consider the role of competition and treats number of 
suppliers as exogenous. She finds that the public discount off private catalog price is also positively 
related to number of licenses, which she interprets as consistent with the bargaining hypothesis but also 
with price discrimination. Both these studies use data that ignores private sector discounts and predates 
CDC’s shift away from winner-take-all procurement.  
Scherer (2007) takes a more general approach to vaccine shortages. He considers high regulatory 
costs, inadequate profitability and mergers as possible causes of vaccine shortages, and argues that 
economies of scale and scope limit the number of vaccine producers. Focusing on the influenza vaccine 
and assuming that shortages entail foregone vaccination, he provides rough estimates of the costs of 
vaccine shortages and concludes that maintaining additional production sources with surge capacity 
would be cost-justified. Scherer’s view of vaccine markets as natural monopolies in some ways 
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resembles our hypothesis; however, he does not consider the dynamic competition process whereby 
multiple firms enter and then most exit, and his empirical analysis focuses on simulating welfare costs of 
shortages for influenza, not the determinants of product and firm exit which are the focus of our analysis.  
 
III. Vaccine Market Characteristics  
1. Demand 
Although vaccines are highly effective at disease prevention, their success is a winner’s curse for 
producers: the longer the treatment efficacy, the smaller is the annual volume demanded. For pediatric 
vaccines that have lifetime efficacy, potential annual sales volume is limited by the size of the birth 
cohort. Moreover, idiosyncratic government vaccination policies result in different pediatric vaccine 
requirements across countries. The potential annual demand is therefore lower for most vaccine 
formulations than for many therapeutic drugs, especially drugs to treat chronic diseases. For adult 
vaccines and travelers vaccines, efficacy lasts for several years, hence booster doses are necessary to 
maintain protection, but usage is generally limited to at-risk subpopulations.  
 Governments in all industrialized countries require and often subsidize vaccination against 
major contagious diseases. The rationale is that the social benefits of vaccination exceed private benefits, 
because a person who gets vaccinated reduces the probability that they themselves get the disease and 
that they transmit it to others. As more individuals in a group receive vaccination, the risk of contagion 
for those who remain unvaccinated declines to negligible levels – so-called herd immunity – which in 
turn creates an incentive for each individual to free ride on vaccination of others, unless vaccination is 
mandatory. In the US, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) is an advisory body 
comprised of medical experts who recommend vaccination schedules for specific subpopulations. For 
some pediatric vaccines, compliance with these recommendations may be required for school attendance, 
which makes the recommendations essentially a mandate. Government recommendations and mandates 
presumably increase total volume sold for recommended vaccines, compared to unconstrained voluntary 
market demand. But government recommendation or procurement may also concentrate demand on 
preferred products and, conversely, reduce demand for competing, non-recommended products.  
The effect of government’s role on vaccine prices depends on whether and how the government 
actually procures vaccines, and its market share. In the US, the CDC began purchasing vaccines for low 
income children in 1966. During the 1980s, CDC’s share increased, varying across years and across 
vaccines from around 30-40 percent for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussus (DTP) and polio, to 40-50 
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percent and higher for measles, mumps and rubella (MMR). In 1989-1991 a measles epidemic resulted in 
thousands of cases of measles and hundreds of deaths. Following an investigation which showed that 
over half of children with measles had not been vaccinated, in 1993 Congress established the Vaccines 
for Children (VFC) program as an entitlement for children age 18 and below who may not otherwise 
have access to vaccines.7 Consequently the public share of childhood vaccines increased to over 50 
percent.  Procurement strategies have varied over time, as purchasers learned about the effects of their 
strategies on long term supply. Prior to 1993, the CDC applied a winner-take-all strategy, awarding all 
sales to the lowest bidder. This resulted in low prices and great volume uncertainty for suppliers. Since 
1998, the CDC solicits bid prices annually, which suppliers can adjust monthly but only downward. The 
CDC posts bid prices of potential suppliers, negotiates broad supply contracts, usually with a near-zero 
minimum and a negotiated maximum quantity. State and local recipients of federal funds for vaccines 
purchased under the VFC program choose which approved supplier to use. States that participate in the 
Universal Purchase program may use their own funds to purchase vaccines for non-VFC-eligible patients 
at CDC prices.  
In the private sector, vaccines are purchased by individual physicians and by hospitals and other 
institutions that often using group purchasing organization to negotiate prices with vaccine suppliers. 
These private purchasers are highly price sensitive because they usually face a fixed reimbursement per 
vaccine type from third party payers. Since they capture any margin, positive or negative, between the 
reimbursement and their acquisition cost for the vaccine, their cross-price demand elasticity between 
competing products is likely to be high. In such contexts, suppliers generally compete for market share 
by offering discounts below the reimbursement price.  
The global vaccine market similarly consists of large concentrated purchasers, each with somewhat 
specific requirements. In most industrialized countries, national governments play a dominant role in 
defining vaccination schedules, vaccine procurement and price setting. Vaccine purchase for Latin 
America is largely managed by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), but each individual 
country decides which vaccines to purchase. Procurement and price negotiations are coordinated through 
PAHO, using competitive bidding. For developing countries, including purchases financed through 
GAVI, UNICEF serves as the procurement agency. For basic pediatric vaccines, UNICEF accounts for 
40% of global volume but only 5% of market value. Between 1992 and 2002, the number of 
manufacturers offering UNICEF its key DTP, BCG (tuberculosis), TT (tetanus) and measles vaccines 
dwindled to 3 or 4 for each vaccine.8 UNICEF has switched from winner-take-all procurement to 
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spreading its demand across several suppliers, in order to keep them in the market and protect against 
supply interruptions. Most of the supply to UNICEF is now from Indian and other emerging market 
suppliers, with only small shares from the large multinational companies that supply the industrialized 
countries. This partly reflects differentiation of products, as the industrialized countries, especially the 
US, have moved towards newer, more costly combinations of basic vaccines, acellular pertussis, IPV, 
and thimerosal-free products, whereas UNICEF purchases older, cheaper formulations.9 
 
2. Supply 
Cost Structure  Bringing a new vaccine to market entails high fixed investments in R&D 
(research, compound formulation and clinical development) and manufacturing capacity, each component 
of which is subject to regulatory requirements for safety and quality assurance. The batch process 
required for vaccines also entails semi-fixed costs per batch. A batch may take 6-18 months to produce, 
depending on the type of vaccine and production methods. Thus production is characterized by very high 
fixed and semi-fixed sunk costs and low marginal cost per unit within each batch up to the capacity limit 
defined by the maximum number of batches for the manufacturing plant.10 Changing production 
technology to meet changed regulatory standards or expand scale takes years and millions of dollars, and 
requires FDA approval for the new plant. Such costs may be worth incurring only if they can be recouped 
over several years of sales. 
Costs related to regulatory compliance have increased over time to meet rising quality standards. 
In addition, several explicit shocks have necessitated major new investments. In particular, the 1972 
requirement that all vaccines demonstrate efficacy imposed new costs on pre-1962 vaccines that had been 
grandfathered under the 1962 FDA Amendments. The 1999 CDC request that manufacturers remove 
thimerosal required product and plant redesign and reapproval of manufacturing processes and facilities. 
The removal of thimerosal, which is a preservative, may have exacerbated the short shelf life problem of 
vaccines, at least until new technologies could be developed and built into new plants.   
Patents and generic entry Patent barriers to entry of competitors are weak for most vaccines, 
which often rely on propriety strains of the virus and sometimes process patents. These do not preclude 
other firms from using different strains to supply competing products during the life of any patents. 
However, because vaccines are biologics, generics have not been able to use the abbreviated new drug 
application (ANDA) process which enables generic equivalents of chemical drugs to get approval by 
showing bioequivalence to the originator product. Thus follow-on versions of existing vaccines are 
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treated as originators and must undertake de novo clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy. They 
would not necessarily be viewed by physicians/patients as perfect substitutes due to differences in 
vaccine strain.  
Dynamic Competition  Although originator vaccines do not face generic competitors, their 
economic value is continually open to challenge by new, improved products. For example, acellular 
pertussis replaced whole cell pertussis; inactivated polio replaced oral polio; and combination products 
have replaced single product forms for most pediatric vaccines.11 Anticipation of improved technologies 
undermines incentives to invest in new variants of older technologies or plants, particularly given the 
long lead times required by such investments. The tendency for dynamic entry of new, improved 
technologies to displace old technologies may be exacerbated by government recommendation of the new 
over the older product, and concentrated public and private purchasing.  
Liability risks   Tort liability has sometimes been a more severe risk for vaccines than 
for most therapeutic drugs, because vaccines treat large numbers of healthy individuals, usually children, 
and risks may be correlated.12 Allegations and litigation related to the pertussis vaccine in the 1980s were 
followed by the exit of three of the four manufacturers of pertussis vaccine (Offit, 2005). In 1986 
Congress established the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VCIP) to provide no-fault 
compensation to children injured as a result of pediatric vaccines. Influenza vaccine is also covered by 
the VCIP, and other vaccines may apply. Vaccine manufacturers may still occasionally face tort claims – 
for example, recent claims related to thimerosal argued that this was a preservative, not intrinsic to the 
vaccine. Although these claims have generally not succeeded, the legal costs of defending against claims 
and the risk that some may eventually succeed may act as a disincentive for vaccine entry. However, this 
risk is now probably modest, at least for pediatric vaccines that are covered by the VCIP.  
 
3. Market Equilibrium  
High fixed costs of regulation and production are not a barrier to entry if these costs can, with 
reasonable certainty, be recouped over large volume and/or high margins. But the interaction of high 
fixed costs with relatively low, concentrated and unpredictable demand and perishable supply is likely to 
result in a market equilibrium that supports only one or few suppliers in most vaccine markets at any 
point in time. If multiple firms initially enter and each faces non-increasing cost per unit, the equilibrium 
non-cooperative price is equal to marginal cost assuming Bertrand strategies.13 The intuition is simple: 
once regulatory, capacity and batch costs are sunk, with few alternative customers in the current period 
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and limited storage potential for future use, any excess of price above marginal cost contributes to 
covering the sunk costs, whereas if a firm loses a contract to a competitor, the product is likely to go to 
waste. Moreover, because capacity and batch production entail fixed and semi-fixed costs, respectively, 
that need to be planned a long time in advance, producers tend to target for high volumes of production 
as they cannot adjust later if demand is higher than anticipated. If such pricing is anticipated, all but one 
firm will eventually exit and new entry is unlikely, unless the new product has superior quality or lower 
cost than the incumbent. The likelihood of a sole supplier equilibrium is greater, the smaller the market 
relative to minimum efficient scale of production; the shorter the shelf-life of the product; and the more 
uniform are consumer preferences over product quality. Market dominance and survival in vaccines thus 
tends to be related to product superiority for the majority of patients, not to first mover advantage in a 
class. 
Multiple products may coexist if they differ in efficacy or safety for different patient groups – for 
example, if some patients cannot tolerate one component of a combination, a variant that excludes that 
component may survive, as in the case of DTP and DT.14 Even then, a single firm is likely to dominate in 
supplying these differentiated products if it has economies of scope from producing both the combination 
and the component products. By contrast, in many on-patent pharmaceutical classes multiple products 
coexist because each product works best for some patients; markets are generally larger; customers are 
mostly atomistic purchasers, are price-insensitive due to insurance, and are not driven by government 
recommendation; and the greater potential for storage enables manufacturers to inventory excess output 
for future sale.  
With a sole supplier of a mandated childhood vaccine, the government share of the market 
becomes a bilateral monopoly: the government has significant monopsony power because the 
manufacturer has incurred significant sunk costs and has no other purchasers of comparable size, but the 
government also has no alternative suppliers. Given the declining number of producers, it is unsurprising 
that the CDC discounts decreased over time, from an average of 75 percent off the supplier’s catalog 
price in 1987 to 50 percent in 1997, and that discounts are less on the newest, single manufacturer 
vaccines, such as varicella (9%) and pneumococcal conjugate (22%).15  
In summary, the role of government purchasing in US vaccine markets has been to define 
procurement rules for required vaccines that are eligible for government subsidy. Prior to 1998, this 
involved competitive tendering and centralized purchasing. Since 1998, the CDC simply solicits bids 
from willing suppliers and purchasing is devolved to the states. The only direct price regulation is a 
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ceiling on price increases, set at the growth in the consumer price index (CPI), for vaccines that had 
federal contracts in 1993. This regulation created incentives for suppliers to develop new formulations of 
the price-constrained products – such as combinations – which are not subject to the CPI price cap. Of 
the 48 vaccine licenses in existence in the US in 2004, 17 were issued after 1993 (see Danzon et al. 2005, 
Exhibit 1). Moreover, the fact that supplier exit and supply disruptions have occurred for flu vaccine, for 
which the government is a minor purchaser and does not set price, suggests that government purchase is 
not a necessary condition of firm exits (see below).  
 The conventional wisdom, that government purchase and “price controls” are the major 
contributors to lack of vaccine profitability, predicts that vaccine exit would be positively related to the 
quantity purchased by the government and inversely related to the government price.16 By contrast, our 
model predicts that exit is triggered by static and dynamic competition, due to the high fixed costs and 
concentrated market demand. This model predicts that vaccine exit is positively related to the number of 
competitors and is more likely following entry of competitor vaccines that have some clear technological 
superiority, particularly if this superiority is reinforced by government recommendations. Similarly, entry 
of combination products is likely to displace the single components or smaller combinations.  
In addition to withdrawal of vaccine products, the number of vaccine manufacturers has also been 
reduced through exit and mergers, including the acquisition of Connaught Laboratories by the Mérieux 
Institute in 1989 and Chiron’s purchase of Sclavo in 1998 and Powderject in 2003. Merger of firms need 
not necessarily lead to exit of products; for example, if the merger is motivated by economies of scope 
across vaccine types, the range of combination products offered following a merger might increase. But if 
being acquired by another vaccine manufacturer is the least costly way of absorbing the excess 
production capacity for a product that has become obsolete, then an acquired product would be more 
likely to exit. In that case the merger would be a symptom rather than the underlying cause of the exit of 
the obsolete product. 
   
IV. Data and Methods 
1. Data  
We collected data on the dates of grant and withdrawal of all vaccine licenses authorized by the 
FDA for the period 1901 to 2003. For most of our analysis, the unit of observation is a vaccine product 
license, which authorizes a specific product and plant to manufacture that product. For vaccines that are 
used both alone and in various combinations, each component vaccine and each combination has a 
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separate license and counts as a separate observation. For example, diphtheria vaccine exists alone and 
has been used in seven combinations, tetanus exists alone and has been used in eight combinations. 
During our time period, 241 licenses were granted, of which 179 were withdrawn and 62 survived as of 
2003.  
We also report analysis of exit of vaccine suppliers at the firm level, using the FDA data on the 
firm holding the license. Thirty nine firms held at least one license during our time period; of these, 10 
firms were acquired and 12 exited the vaccine business (measured by having no subsequent vaccine 
licenses).  
We obtained quantities purchased and prices paid by CDC, by vaccine, for all years for which data 
were available. Where data were missing for a few years, we imputed missing values by extrapolating 
between adjacent values.  
 
2. Methods, Variable Definitions and Hypotheses 
Because we have interval censored data, we estimate a hazard model of vaccine exit, using a 
complementary log log function with time varying values of co-variates:  
Hjt= h{Cj,t-1, Rj,t-1,Zt-1, Xt-1 }      (1) 
In equation (1), Hjt is the hazard of exit of product j in period t, conditional on being licensed in 
period t-1. Explanatory variables include various measures of competition, C;  measures of CDC 
purchase and other regulatory influence, R;  other product-specific or firm-specific characteristics, Z; and 
other factors, X. These variables and related hypotheses are defined below. 
Competition  Since many vaccines exist both as single products and in combination with 
other products (e.g. diphtheria + tetanus + pertussis (DTaP); measles, mumps, rubella (MMR)), there is 
no unique measure of number of competitors for each vaccine. We considered three alternative measures 
of number of competitor products: Direct Competitors is the number of variants of a specific vaccine (e.g. 
diphtheria alone) produced by competitor firms (excluding the firm in question), and Indirect 
Competitors includes all combinations that include the specific vaccine (e.g. all combinations that include 
diphtheria); and All Competitors is the sum of Direct and Indirect Competitors. Exit is expected to be 
positively related to both direct and indirect competition. Greater effects are predicted for Direct 
Competitors (same vaccine) if substitutability is the only issue; however, if patients prefer combination 
products over single vaccines (due to the greater convenience, lower time costs and perhaps lower out-of-
pocket cost), then Indirect Competitors is expected to have a larger effect on exit hazards than Direct 
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Competitors. We also include an indicator variable, Single, for products that are the sole source of a 
particular vaccine. Single products are less likely to exit, assuming that sole suppliers face higher mean 
and lower variance of expected revenue than producers that face competitors.  
To test for effects of dynamic quality competition, we include the number of New Products of 
exactly the same vaccine type between years t and t+1. New product entry is expected to increase the 
likelihood of exit of established products, if newer entrants on average have superior attributes compared 
to existing products. We also tested measures of entry defined over t-2 to t+2. The measure reported here, 
based on entrants in t to t+1, was consistently the most significant, suggesting that exit responds to 
anticipated as well as actual entry. This variable includes new vaccines introduced by each vaccine’s 
parent firm, so it reflects a firm’s own strategy as well as response to competitors. We also include a 
binary variable, Input, that takes the value 1 if a product is also an input for combinations produced by 
the same firm in period t.  
Government Procurement and Liability Variables   Universal Recommendation is a binary 
indicator of whether the vaccine was recommended for universal purchase by the ACIP; it is expected to 
be negatively related to the product exit hazard, if ACIP recommendation increases demand for a 
vaccine.17  
Government procurement is predicted to have a negative effect on price but possibly a positive 
effect on volume, with uncertain net effect on exit hazards. To test these hypotheses, we tried three 
possible measures of the quantity of CDC purchase: total doses of each vaccine type that were purchased 
by CDC in t-1 (CDC Quantity); the expected number of doses purchased by CDC per licensee 
(CDCQ/licensee) assuming that the total government purchase were allocated equally among suppliers; 
and CDC share of doses (Share CDCq). These proxies for expected volume are expected to be negatively 
related to exit hazard, if CDC procurement increases expected demand for a vaccine. The price per dose 
paid by CDC for each vaccine type in t-1 (CDCPrice) is expected to be inversely related to the exit 
hazard.18 All prices were inflation-adjusted using the CPI price index. A binary variable indicates the 
years before 1966, the first year of any CDC procurement (Pre CDC) and another binary variable 
indicates if a vaccine type was not purchased by CDC in t-1 (No CDC).19 If the net effect of government 
procurement is to increase the likelihood of vaccine exit, the coefficient of No CDC should be negative. 
A similar prediction applies tentatively to Pre-CDC; however, since other factors also changed between 
the pre-1966 and post-1966 environment, including many more potential competitors in the market, the 
interpretation of this variable is ambiguous and it is included mainly as a control.   
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A binary variable, Strict Liability (SL) was created to indicate years after 1966, when the Second 
Restatement of Torts adopted strict product liability. The coefficient is expected to be positive if this 
increased the liability exposure of vaccine manufacturers in ways that could not be costlessly covered by 
insurance.20 However, because SL is perfectly collinear with the Pre CDC indicator, both cannot be 
included in regression analysis. A binary variable, Vaccine Injury Compensation Program it-1, indicates 
that the vaccine was covered by the VICP in year t-1; the coefficient is expected to be negative if, by 
reducing expected liability costs, the VICP significantly increased manufacturers’ incentives to remain in 
the market. We also include an indicator Thimerosal, which indicates vaccines that contained thimerosal 
in years after 1998; it is expected to be positive, if the requirement to remove thimerosal imposed in early 
1999 contributed to vaccine exit. OBRA is an indicator for vaccines that were subject to the CPI cap on 
price increases; it is expected to be positive if this constraint was binding. 
Product and Firm-Specific Factors   Age is the number of years since the product license was 
first granted; it is expected to be positive if new products offer superior quality and hence tend to displace 
older products. Year of Entry measures the vaccine’s year of launch. Acquired is a binary indicator for 
vaccines that have been acquired from the original licensee; the coefficient is expected to be positive if 
acquisition is a means to exit the market and transfer production capacity to other uses. Foreign is a 
binary indicator for non-US firms. To test whether vaccines are less likely to be withdrawn if the 
manufacturer has a large or diversified vaccine portfolio across which to spread firm-specific fixed costs, 
we include a Herfindahl index of concentration of each manufacturer’s products over vaccine types.21 If 
economies of scope across vaccine types are significant, due to spreading fixed costs of human or 
physical capital, risk diversification or potential for product combination, then exit is less likely for 
diversified firms. Table 1 lists variable definitions with means and standard deviations. 
 
IV. Descriptive Evidence 
There were 241 vaccine product licenses granted between 1901 and 2003, of which 179 were 
withdrawn and 62 survived as of 2003. These products were supplied by a total of 45 firms, including 
several government and academic suppliers. Of these 45, 18 firms remained as of 2003.   
Figure 1 shows the number of entries, exits and total number of licenses by year, for the period 
1901-2003. There are few vaccines in the first three decades, with products for polio (1901), smallpox 
(1903), rabies (1915) and typhoid (1916). Entry occurs steadily from the mid-1930s onward, with spikes 
around 1952, 1963 and 1970 reflecting entry of 13, 11 and 39 new licenses, respectively.  
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License exits are rare initially, with only 3 prior to 1970. In 1970, 12 exits occur, of which 11 are 
due to the exit of a single manufacturer (Miles Inc.). Another large spurt of exits occurs in 1977 through 
1981, possibly related to the mid-70s liability “crisis” which raised the price and reduced availability of 
product liability insurance. This large exit flow again reflects multiple products of a few manufacturers, 
in particular: Eli Lilly withdrew 14 products; Dow Chemical withdrew 11 products and exited totally in 
1978; the Texas Department of Health Resources withdrew 7 products and exited totally in 1979; Pfizer 
withdrew 4 oral polio products and exited totally in 1979; and Parke Davis withdrew 16 products and 
exited totally in 1981. These products that were withdrawn between 1970 and 1981 represent several 
different vaccine types, but many were variants of diphtheria and tetanus, which had become very 
crowded markets, and three of the four pertussis producers exited. Partly in response to this exodus of 
manufacturers from the vaccine market, the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program was established in 
1986. Whether for this or other reasons, no more manufacturer exits occurred until 1988, when Eli Lilly 
withdrew its last product and exited, followed by Wellcome in 1994 and Parkedale in 2001. The spike of 
product exits in 2000-2003 includes 5 by Bioport, 4 by Aventis Pasteur and 14 by Wyeth.   
To illustrate the life-cycle of competitive entry, Figure 2 plots the mean number of products of 
given vaccine type, by year from the date of first launch of that type. The predicting equation is a simple 
regression of number of competitors on an intercept and a quadratic in years since launch, all of which 
are significant at the 1% level. Separate estimates are made for Direct Competitors (same product) and 
for Indirect Competitors (combinations that include this product).22 Interestingly, entry occurs mainly in 
Indirect Competitors. The predicted number of Direct Competitors increases slowly from launch to reach 
a maximum of about 4 and then declines slowly. By contrast, the predicted number of Indirect 
Competitors increases more sharply and peaks at roughly fourteen.23 Note that within the average pattern 
of life-cycle entry shown in Figure 2, the experience varies across different vaccine types. In particular, 
some of the mandated pediatric vaccines, especially diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, were in numerous 
combinations in the 1970s and then were combined with Hib, Hepatitis B and inactivated polio more 
recently. At the other extreme, vaccines such as smallpox, rabies, cholera, lyme disease, have had only 
one or two suppliers throughout their life-cycles and have never been combined with other vaccines. We 
report the multivariate analysis of product exit based on the full sample; however, results were essentially 
the same and significance increased slightly when we excluded those vaccines that had only a single 
producer over the entire period.  
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V. Hazard Function Analysis of Vaccine Exit 
Table 2 reports hazard ratios from the hazard function analysis of vaccine exit, including measures 
of competition, regulation, product and firm characteristics. Table 3 reports alternative specifications to 
estimate the effects of CDC purchase, controlling only for product age and year of entry. The coefficients 
are hazard ratios, hence values less (greater) than 1 imply reduced (increased) probability of exit.   
In Table 2, the first equation includes only basic product characteristics and a control for the pre-
CDC time period which is also the period before formal adoption of strict liability. Unfortunately, 
because both the procurement and the legal regime changed in 1966 these two variables are highly 
correlated and cannot be included together. Successive specifications then add various measures of 
competition, firm characteristics and regulation. The hazard rate of exit increases between 5 and 9 
percent for each year the vaccine is on the market. However, this rate also increases around 3 to 6 percent 
with year of entry, implying that newer vintage vaccines are at higher risk of exit. These estimates are 
robust to the addition of measures of competition, regulation and other characteristics. The pre-CDC 
indicator is strongly negative, implying that vaccine exit risk was much lower in the pre-CDC/pre-Strict 
liability era. The estimated effect of the pre-CDC indicator declines but remains significantly negative in 
specifications that control for measures of competition, and CDC prices and quantities.  
Controlling for these basic product and time period characteristics, each additional Direct 
Competitor increases the exit hazard rate by roughly 3 percent, and each additional Indirect Competitor 
increases exit hazard rate by 2 percent. Controlling for number of competitors in year t, the entry of new 
competitors in year t to t+1 increases the exit hazard of established products by 2-3 percent, consistent 
with the dynamic competition hypothesis, that new entrants are typically superior products and therefore 
tend to accelerate the exit of established products. Vaccines that are monopoly suppliers (Single) have an 
exit hazard over 50 percent lower than vaccines that have competitors. This supports the hypothesis that 
competition contributes to low prices and hence that sole supplier products are more able to achieve 
prices necessary to cover long run costs. Vaccines that are inputs to combinations have a 70 percent 
lower exit hazard than other vaccines, as expected if these core input vaccines tend to complement rather 
than substitute for the combination vaccines to which they contribute.  
The effects of policy variables are mixed. Vaccines that are recommended for Universal Purchase 
have a 60 percent lower exit rate. Controlling for Universal Purchase, we find no significant effect of 
whether or not the CDC is a purchaser of the vaccine, the volume of units purchased by the CDC or the 
CDC price. Similarly, we find no significant effect of eligibility for the Vaccine Injury Compensation 
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Program or the indicator that a vaccine was subject to the OBRA price control. Following the adverse 
publicity over thimerosal in 1998 and requirement to eliminate it in early 1999, products that contained 
thimerosal have an exit hazard that is 44 percent higher. Although this coefficient is not significant at 
conventional levels, this may reflect the very small number of products involved.  
Vaccines that have been acquired are less likely to exit than vaccines that are still owned by their 
originator firm, but this result is not significant. This evidence suggests that merger of firms has not been 
a major contributor to exit of vaccine products, although it has reduced the number of vaccine suppliers. 
Rather, the evidence here tentatively supports the theory of merger as a market for corporate control, in 
which vaccines are acquired in order to enhance their market potential, not as a means to eliminate excess 
capacity. The Herfindahl measure of a firm’s vaccine portfolio is not significant. However, vaccines 
produced by foreign firms are less likely to exit, exhibiting a hazard rate that is close to 70 percent lower 
than US firms. This could suggest that foreign firms face higher regulatory and other costs of entry, such 
that foreign firms only launch in the US the subset of their products that have atypically high potential 
value and survival potential.  
Table 3 reports more detailed attempts to estimate the effects of CDC purchasing. Controlling for a 
vaccine’s age and cohort, the indicator for the pre-CDC time period is strongly negative, implying 
increased exit risk in the post-CDC time period. Given the highly correlated timing of increased 
government purchasing by CDC, increased tort liability risk following the 1966 Second Restatement of 
Torts  and increased FDA-related costs after the 1962 FDA Amendments, their marginal contributions 
cannot be identified and the Pre-CDC variable must be interpreted as reflecting their combined effects. 
Controlling for these factors, the coefficient on the indicator for no CDC purchase is positive but not 
significant. The measures of CDC quantity are not significant. The CDC price is negative, consistent with 
the expectation that a lower price should increase the exit hazard, but the coefficient is not significant at 
conventional levels. Our CDC price and quantity variables may be measured with error, which may 
create bias towards finding no significant effects. We lack data on private sector prices and hence are 
unable to normalize the CDC price by the private sector price. Even if list prices to private purchasers 
were available, these would not measure transactions prices which are often significantly discounted. 
Overall, these results based on the universe of vaccines for the entire industry lifetime suggest that having 
a Universal Purchase recommendation significantly reduces the probability of exit, consistent with the 
prediction that universal purchase increases demand for a vaccine. However, the volume and price of 
CDC purchase do not appear to have significant effects, possibly because the negative effect of 
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government purchase on price is offset by the positive effect on volume, leading to no significant net 
effect. The probability of exit was lower before 1966, but whether this reflects absence of CDC 
purchasing, lower liability threat or other factors cannot be distinguished given the correlation between 
these factors.  
We also examined the exit of firms (as opposed to individual products) from the vaccine business. 
Explanatory power is lower, implying that there are unmeasured firm-specific factors underling each 
firm’s decision to exit the vaccines market, although some common features may underlie these decisions. 
Table 4 presents the hazard rates for exit of firms from the vaccine market for any reason. 24 Firm exit 
probability increases around 10 percent for each year the firm has been in the market, which is consistent 
with the hypothesis that increasing costs of regulatory compliance as technologies become obsolete may 
contribute to the probability of exit of firms. At the same time, firms that entered the market later are less 
likely to stay in the market and are more likely to be acquired, possibly because these are small firms 
formed to develop newer technologies that become desirable to established firms. Although having 
recently obtained a new license does not affect the likelihood of firm exit, it decreases the likelihood of a 
firm being acquired.  
 
VI. Evidence from Other Industrialized Countries 
High fixed costs would be most widely spread if each vaccine were distributed globally. In fact, 
the diffusion of vaccines appears to be more limited than for many drugs, even across industrialized 
countries. Table 5 lists the licensed producers of each of the major pediatric vaccines and several adult 
vaccines in Canada, France, Portugal, the UK, and the US. 
These data are broadly consistent with hypotheses outlined here, that vaccine production entails 
high country-specific fixed costs and concentrated demand, such that each market supports at most a few 
producers. As predicted, each country has few producers of each vaccine. However, for several vaccine 
types, the US has fewer producers than these other countries which all have smaller potential volumes 
and more dominant government purchase.25 The fact that several firms have products available in these 
countries that are not available in the US suggests that entry into the US is not attractive, given the fixed 
costs of entry combined with price and volume uncertainty of competing with established products.  
The number of licenses per manufacturer and vaccine is also often higher in Canada and Europe 
than in the US. This suggests that the cost of compliance with more stringent regulatory requirements 
may contribute to fewer licensed products being maintained in the US. Note that in Table 5 the US 
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licenses include some that are inactive and some for further manufacturing only, hence this count of 
licenses overstates the number of active producers in the US. These data also indicate that, although 
national immunization plans are similar across developed countries, the specific vaccines recommended 
within each category still vary, for example, in the use of combination vaccines. Country-specific 
requirements limit the potential for manufacturing economies of scale and may require the development 
of country-specific products.  
 
VII. Flu Vaccine – A Case Study  
A brief history of the supply of flu vaccine in the US illustrates how fixed costs, dynamic 
competition and preemptive effects of superior products can lead to few suppliers, despite a limited role 
for government purchase. Influenza is an extreme case of limited storability. The influenza virus has two 
strains: Type A, which has several subtypes, and Type B. Because these types undergo antigenic “drift”, 
the influenza vaccine must be reformulated each year to match the circulating strains. Since 1998, the 
World Health Organization has issued separate recommendations in February and September for the 
Northern and Southern Hemispheres, respectively.26 In the US, the vaccine composition for the upcoming 
flu season is determined between February and March. Since the peak flu season is November-March, 
manufacturers must supply the vaccine by October to early November. 
The injectable vaccine is traditionally cultured on embryonic eggs and then sterilized. Monovalent 
concentrates are produced and combined into the multivalent form, with comprehensive quality control at 
each step in the process. This time consuming process requires that supply be estimated almost a year in 
advance, and quick ramp up of production is impossible. A newer method of culturing the viruses using 
mammalian cells is not yet approved in the US. 
There has been a significant increase in flu vaccine production above the approximately 20 million 
doses distributed annually in the mid-1980’s.27 In 1993, flu vaccine was covered under Medicaid and 
Medicare Part B. Prior to 2000, the ACIP recommended vaccination primarily of seniors and other high 
risk individuals. In 2000, the ACIP recommendation was extended to people aged 50 to 65 and to infants 
aged 6-23 months in 2002. In 2003, pediatric vaccination was approved for use of VFC funds. By 2009, 
the number of doses per year had increased to 113 million (Table 6). Actual uptake has increased but 
remains unpredictable at less than 50% of the recommended population. In 2001, only 87.7M of the 
recommended 152M people were vaccinated.28 In 2003, although recommended recipients increased to 
182M, manufacturers distributed only 83M doses.29 
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In 1999, there were four manufacturers in the US producing a total of 77.9M doses: Aventis 
Pasteur, Wyeth, Parkedale (owned by King Pharmaceuticals), and Powderject (acquired by Chiron, now 
part of Novartis). In October 1999, Parkedale was cited by the FDA for violations of manufacturing 
standards. Six months later, Parkedale was ordered to halt production and distribution because it 
remained out of compliance. On September 27, 2000 the FDA again ordered operations halted, giving the 
company 30 days to implement changes. But given the short window for effective vaccination, it was 
unlikely that the necessary changes could be completed for that year’s season. Instead, Parkedale 
announced its withdrawal from flu vaccine production, writing off some $45M rather than incurring the 
costs of upgrading. Wyeth had produced influenza vaccine for the US market for over two decades. In 
October of 2000, Wyeth was fined $30M for the violations and an additional $15,000 per day out of 
compliance (capped at $5M).30 In November 2002, Wyeth announced that it would exit, which left only 2 
manufacturers of injectible influenza vaccine.31 
In December 2002, shortly after Wyeth’s exit, Aventis pledged $80 million investment to increase 
filling and formulation capacity, in addition to significant capital investments in 2001 to increase its 
capacity by 20%.32 In early 2003, Chiron acquired its Liverpool plant from Powderject and began 
aggressive expansion to serve the expected growth in US demand. Chiron produced 25.6M doses in 2002, 
and 35.6M in 2003. Before being shut down by the UK regulatory authorities just weeks before the 2004 
influenza season, Chiron estimated it would produce 46-48M doses for the US. It has been suggested this 
rapid expansion at an aging factory contributed to the contamination problems that occurred.33 About $75 
million has been spent to upgrade the factory in the last five years. In addition, Chiron committed to 
spending another $100 million to replace part of the plant.34  
In July 2003, FluMist, an intranasally administered, live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV), 
produced by MedImmune was approved. But because of its restricted indications (initially, for use in 
healthy people aged 5 – 50) and its relatively high price, FluMist captured only a small share of the 
expanding market. More generally, LAIV products are unlikely to alleviate vaccine shortages because 
they are restricted to low risk individuals and they rely on the same embryonic egg based process. For 
2004-2005, MedImmune planned to make only 2M doses, despite a capacity to make 20M doses.35  
This shrinkage of the number of flu vaccine suppliers cannot be blamed on government purchase 
and price controls. Less than 20% of flue vaccine is publicly purchased.36 Medicare reimburses for flu 
vaccine at 95 percent of Average Wholesale Price (AWP), which is a list price set by pricing guides such 
as the Red Book, based on the manufacturers’ list price to wholesalers.37 Although provider 
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reimbursement is at 95% of AWP, manufacturer prices are determined by competitive bids for sales to 
physicians, hospitals and others who dispense flu vaccine. Thus manufacturer prices for flu vaccines 
reflect competition rather than regulation. Given the high fixed costs and low marginal costs and total 
absence of storability of flu vaccine, it is not surprising that competition leads to low prices. Faced with 
low prices and volatile demand, manufacturers have chosen to exit rather than incur the significant costs 
of bringing manufacturing capacity up to the high standards required. Unpredictability resulting from the 
production technology and the very short demand window are also critical. Despite the reality of repeated 
shortages, millions of doses are wasted each year, because of overall demand uncertainty and mismatch 
of supply to meet the narrow demand window (see Table 6).  
But the US flu market also illustrates the importance of threat of dynamic competition from 
superior products in vaccine investment decisions. While manufacturers are reluctant to invest additional 
capacity based on current embryonic egg based methods, several companies are developing mammalian 
cell-based vaccines. Mammalian cell-derived vaccines are expected to provide equivalent or better 
efficacy, with lower contamination risk, less wastage and shorter production time (see Table 7).38 
In 2003, Solvay's Influvac TC (cell culture) product was approved in the Netherlands, and since 
then has been approved in over 60 countries. 39  No cell culture influenza vaccine is yet approved in the 
US but several are in clinical trials.40 Given the potential superiority of cell-based products, egg-based 
products are likely to become obsolete, hence further investment in egg-based capacity is not worthwhile 
without government subsidy. In November 2009, Novartis inaugurated the US’s first large scale flu cell 
culture vaccine manufacturing facility, which is planned to be running at full scale commercial 
production in 2013. 41 At the same time, an FDA advisory panel rejected approval of the US’s first cell-
based influenza vaccine developed by Protein Sciences Corporation.42 
The global supply of flu vaccines (Table 8) shows a lack of global diffusion similar to other 
vaccines in Table 5. There are over 30 manufacturers of flu vaccine worldwide but many operate in a 
limited number of countries.43 Solvay (now part of Abbott Laboratories), one of the EU’s largest 
suppliers and the leader in the new cell-based methods, does not have a product approved in the US as of 
December 2010. Despite potential for growth in the US market and lack of government price controls, 
there was little incentive for other companies to enter or expand using the old technology, although entry 
was anticipated and is now occurring with newer technologies that will likely eventually render the old 
technology obsolete. The 2004-2005 influenza vaccine shortage, together with concern over a potential 
pandemic outbreak, including the avian flu in 2005 and the H1N1 swine flu in 2009, led the US 
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government to award grants to help companies expand their influenza vaccine capacity and develop faster 
and more reliable manufacturing processes than the traditional egg culture vaccines. Furthermore, the 
recommendation for the annual influenza vaccination by the CDC’s Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices has been enlarged to cover around 300 million people compared to 200 million in 
2004.44 These changes stimulated an increase in the number of producers from three in 2004 to five in 
2010. 
Nevertheless, and even though the market for seasonal influenza vaccines across the seven major 
markets (United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK), has had a strong compound 
annual growth rate of 12.6% since 2005, in fact the US market is still dominated by a small number of 
firms, with Sanofi-Pasteur, GSK and Novartis (formerly Chiron) producing more than 90% of the 
vaccines. 45 Since this demand growth will likely flatten off, further consolidation of this market may be 
likely.  
 
Conclusions  
This analysis suggests that US vaccine markets are likely to reach equilibrium with only one or at 
most a few suppliers of each vaccine type. This reflects the interaction of high fixed costs with 
concentrated, price-sensitive demand and dynamic quality competition in which product superiority is 
reinforced by government recommendation. In such conditions, there is no incentive to introduce “me-too” 
vaccines, which could not plausibly compete with established firms unless they offer some clear quality 
or cost advantage. Consequently, new vaccine R&D targets improved technologies for existing vaccines 
or new vaccine categories. Entry of superior products in turn leads to exit of the now obsolete inferior 
products. Many vaccines that are approved in other industrialized markets have not applied to enter the 
US, presumably due in part to high costs of regulatory approval and manufacturing compliance, 
combined with limited and risky demand, with both price and volume uncertainty if multiple firms are 
competing for the business. The flu vaccine illustrates the contribution to supply problems of high 
regulatory hurdles, fixed costs, demand uncertainty and the threat of dynamic competition. Pediatric 
vaccines face similar regulatory, cost and dynamic competitive conditions; pricing may be more 
controlled, due to the large market share purchased by the CDC, but volume is more predictable, 
provided that there are only one or two suppliers in the market.  
These economic realities pose difficult policy challenges. Harmonization of country-specific 
regulatory requirements might increase the diffusion of products across the industrialized markets, 
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particularly between the EU, Canada and the US. However, given the importance of vaccine policy to 
public health, national health authorities are unlikely to delegate autonomy on vaccine recommendations 
and schedules. Perhaps the best hope comes from scientific advances that may improve the storability of 
vaccines or reduce the lead time required for production. Such improvements would mitigate temporary 
supply disruptions. Although stockpiles would not protect against withdrawal of a sole supplier, both 
theory and our empirical evidence show that a sole supplier is much less likely to exit, unless a superior 
product enters the market. But while new technologies are our best hope in the long run, in the short run 
new technologies may exacerbate supply shortages, by undermining incentives to invest in older plants 
that are destined to become obsolete. 
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Table 1 – Variables 
Variables Definition N Mean SD 
Age 
Number of years since license was 
established. 6883 20.74 16.2 
Year of entry (YE) Year the vaccine was licensed. 6883 1950.21 23.51 
Strict Liability (SL) 
Binary variable equal to one from 1966 
onwards, i.e., the year the second 
Restatement of Torts adopted strict 
liability. 
6883 0.43 0.49 
Pre CDC 
Binary variable equal to one if year t is 
before 1966 (first year CDC procured 
vaccines); zero otherwise. 
6883 0.37 0.48 
Input 
Binary variable that measures if the 
vaccine may be used as an input for a 
more complete combination by the firm 
that owns it in year t 
6883 0.3 0.46 
Single 
Binary variable equal to one if the 
vaccine is the only one of its type in the 
market in year t; zero otherwise. 
6883 0.12 0.32 
Direct competitors 
(DC) 
Number of competing products of 
exactly the same type in year t from all 
other producers. 
6883 4.85 4.68 
Indirect Competitors 
(IC) 
Number of competing products from 
all other producers that provide the 
same kind of protection but are not of 
exactly the same type in year t. 
6883 9.4 14.86 
New products (NP) 
Number of new licenses of the same 
type that were launched between year t 
and year t+1. 
6883 1.14 4.19 
Universal 
Recommendation 
(UR) 
Binary variable equal to one if type of 
vaccine was recommended by the 
Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices in year t; zero otherwise. 
6883 0.13 0.34 
Foreign 
Binary variable equal to one if the firm 
that owns the license in not 
headquartered in the USA; zero 
otherwise. 
6883 0.12 0.32 
HHI 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for type 
of licenses owned by the firm in year t. 6883 0.22 0.25 
Acquired Binary variable equal to one if license 6883 0.14 0.35 
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no longer belongs to original 
manufacturer; zero otherwise. 
Vaccine 
Compensation Fund 
(VCF) 
Binary variable if vaccine is covered 
by the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program; zero 
otherwise. 
6883 0.14 0.34 
Obra 
Binary variable if vaccine is covered 
by the Obra cap; zero otherwise. 6883 0.02 0.13 
Thimerosal 
Binary variable equal to one if the 
vaccine contains thimerosal and it is 
after 1998 (the decision to require the 
removal of thimerosal from all 
vaccines was taken in early 1999); zero 
otherwise. 
6883 0.02 0.15 
No CDC 
Binary variable equal to one if type of 
vaccine is not procured by CDC in year 
t-1; zero otherwise. 
6883 0.87 0.34 
CDCQ 
Number of doses of that type of 
vaccine purchased by the CDC in year 
t-1 (in 10s of thousands). 
6821 44.67 172.01 
CDCP 
Price paid by the CDC for that type of 
vaccine in year t-1. 6821 0.13 0.53 
CDCQs 
Number of doses of that type of 
vaccine purchased by the CDC in year 
t-1 divided by the number of licenses 
of that type. 
6821 13.86 63.6 
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Table 2 – Impact of Competition (hazard ratios) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age 1.053a 1.063a 1.067a 1.068a 1.072a 1.085a 1.076a 1.089a 
 (7.21) (6.60) (6.28) (6.29) (6.03) (7.05) (7.11) (6.88) 
YE 1.031a 1.041a 1.040a 1.041a 1.047a 1.063a 1.054a 1.067a 
 (4.71) (5.00) (4.74) (4.81) (5.01) (6.09) (5.71) (5.94) 
SLDV 14.341a 11.332a 9.790a 9.477a 9.483a 7.903a 9.565a 7.319a 
 (8.48) (4.97) (4.63) (4.56) (4.41) (3.86) (4.12) (3.74) 
Input 0.399a 0.322a 0.323a 0.321a 0.251a 0.227a 0.216a 0.223a 
 (-3.39) (-3.48) (-3.31) (-3.36) (-3.91) (-3.62) (-3.53) (-3.67)
Single 0.434a 0.517b 0.539c 0.522c 0.457b 0.446a 0.473b 0.472b 
 (-2.71) (-2.03) (-1.89) (-1.93) (-2.43) (-2.56) (-2.34) (-2.38)
DC  1.055a 1.030b 1.028b 1.024 1.035c 1.032c 1.036b 
  (3.37) (2.007) (1.98) (1.34) (1.95) (1.85) (2.09) 
IC   1.015b 1.013c 1.022a 1.020a 1.019a 1.021a 
   (2.30) (1.95) (2.83) (2.78) (2.75) (2.76) 
NP    1.028a 1.026a 1.028a 1.028a 1.028a 
    (3.84) (4.04) (4.16) (4.08) (4.24) 
UR     0.388a 0.354a 0.337a 0.343a 
     (-3.52) (-3.58) (-3.42) (-2.95)
Foreign      0.308a 0.310a 0.302a 
      (-4.43) (-4.37) (-4.50)
HHI      0.768 0.772 0.803 
      (-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.44)
Acquired      0.869 0.839 0.893 
      (-0.55) (-0.68) (-0.46)
VCF       1.225  
       (0.65)  
Obra       0.947  
       (-0.13)  
Thimerosal       1.444  
       (1.25)  
No CDC        1.053 
        (0.13) 
CDCPrice        0.864 
        (-0.85)
CDCQ/license        1.001 
        (0.69) 
Log-
Likelihood -716.6 -712.8 -709.0 -707.1 -697.7 -683.5 -682.3 -678.9 
Wald chi2 115.64 106.69 102.27 118.58 111.98 195.30 371.45 258.03
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D.o.f. 5 6 7 8 9 12 15 15 
Licenses 241 
Events 179 
Spells 6883 6883 6883 6883 6883 6883 6883 6821 
Note: Figures in parentheses are z-statistics. Superscripts a, b and c indicate that the estimated 
coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 – Market trend and CDC’s role (hazard ratios) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Age 1.107a 1.103a 1.110a 1.111a 1.111a 1.110a 1.111a 
 (14.05) (10.22) (10.81) (10.91) (10.80) (10.93) (10.91) 
YE 1.082a 1.079a 1.086a 1.087a 1.087a 1.086a 1.087a 
 (10.87) (7.94) (8.58) (8.70) (8.63) (8.69) (8.71) 
SLDV 4.014a 3.703a 3.813a 3.779a 3.774a 3.773a 3.757a 
 (8.48) (5.59) (5.99) (6.02) (6.03) (6.05) (6.08) 
Pre CDC  0.729 0.860 0.869 0.867 0.856 0.864 
  (-0.46) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.22) 
No CDC  1.202 1.222 1.058 1.044 1.136 1.025 
  (0.88) (0.70) (0.20) (0.12) (0.52) (0.08) 
CDCQ   1.000  1.000   
   (-0.13)  (-0.12)   
CDCPrice    0.821 0.822  0.842 
    (-1.29) (-1.30)  (-1.19) 
CDCQ/license      0.999 0.999 
      (-0.65) (-0.37) 
        
Log-Likelihood -726.02 -725.54 -720.22 -719.68 -719.68 -719.99 -719.61 
Wald chi2 251.91 265.27 274.35 271.26 276.66 271.05 271.49 
D.o.f. 3 5 6 6 7 6 7 
Licenses 241 
Events 179 
Spells 6883 6883 6821 6821 6821 6821 6821 
Note: Figures in parentheses are z-statistics. Superscripts a, b and c indicate that the estimated 
coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Exit of firms (hazard ratios) 
 Events treated jointly Exit Acquired 
Age 1.099a 1.074a 1.152a 
 (6.17) (4.70) (4.26) 
YE 1.085a 1.068a 1.120a 
 (5.72) (4.04) (3.42) 
Single 0.119b 0.230 0.048b 
 (-2.31) (-1.19) (-2.24) 
Foreign 0.368c 0.311 0.744 
 (-1.79) (-1.46) (-0.35) 
HHI 2.627 10.219 0.789 
 (1.09) (1.63) (-0.18) 
Time since last launch 0.966 1.006 0.881a 
 (-1.15) (0.16) (-2.90) 
Log-Likelihood -86.44 -52.66 -42.40 
Wald chi2 66.57 64.18 30.63 
D.o.f. 6 
Firms 39 
Events 22 12 10 
Spells 1269 
Note: Figures in parentheses are z-statistics. Superscripts a, b and c indicate that the estimated 
coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 - Valid License Holders and Year of License by Country in 2004 
Type USA Canada UK France Portugal 
DTP & HBV & 
IPV & Hib 
   AVT(20001,6) 
GSK(20001) 
AVT(20006) 
GSK(2000) 
DTP & HBV & 
IPV 
GSK(20021)    AVT(19986) 
GSK(2000) 
DTP & IPV & 
Hib 
 AVT(19971) AVT(19981, 
20021) 
AVT(1993, 19936, 
19981, 19981,6) 
GSK(19971) 
AVT(19986, 
20006) 
GSK(1999) 
DTP & HBV     GSK(1996, 1997) 
DTP & Hib AVT(19961) 
WYE(1993) 
 AVT(1995) 
GSK(20021) 
AVT(1993, 19981) AVT(20006) 
GSK(2000) 
DTP & IPV   AVT(19971) AVT(19981, 
20011) 
GSK(20041) 
AVT(19756, 1985, 
19981,6, 20021,6) 
GSK(19961) 
AVT(19986, 
20016, 20026) 
 
DTP AVT(19921, 20021) 
BXT(19981) 
GSK(19971) 
AVT(19961, 
19991) 
AVT(1993) 
CHR(1997) 
GSK(19991, 
20011) 
AVT(1997) AVT(19916) 
GSK(1996, 1997, 
2000) 
RVL(1980) 
DT & IPV  AVT(1984, 1995) AVT(2003) AVT(19776, 20006) AVT(19996) 
DT AVT(19552, 1984, 
1997) 
CHR(1997) 
MBL(19702) 
AVT(19802)
IDB(1991) 
AVT(1993, 
19932) 
CHR(19982) 
AVT(1984, 1996, 
19962) 
AVT(2003) 
GSK(19962) 
RVL(1980, 19802) 
D SSI(1998)    RVL(1969) 
T AVT(1934, 1970) 
MBL(1970) 
SSI(1998) 
AVT(1980) 
IDB(1991) 
AVT(1993) 
CHR(1998, 2001) 
AVT(1973, 19786) 
AVT(19754,6) 
AVT(19875) 
AVT(19916) 
GSK(1996) 
P RFM(19921) 
TKD(19911)  
    
MeaMR MRK(1971) GSK(1998) AVT(1996) AVT(1985, 19936, AVT(19996) 
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MRK(1979) GSK(1997) 19946) 
GSK(1999) 
GSK(1998) 
RVL(1989) 
MeaM MRK(1973)     
MeaR  SSB(1996) AVT(1994) AVT(1981)  
Mea MRK(1963)  AVT(1989) AVT(1986) GSK(1984) 
M MRK(1967)  AVT(1996) AVT(1983, 20016)  
R MRK(1969)  AVT(1989, 1992, 
1995, 1995) 
AVT(1988) AVT(19856) 
PNC_c WYE(2000) WYE(2001)  WYE(2001) WYE(2001) 
PNC_p MRK(1977) AVT(1997) 
MRK(1978) 
AVT(2000, 2000) AVT(1996, 20016, 
20016) 
SLV(1985) 
AVT(19986, 
20016) 
 
Polio AVT(19873, 19903) 
WYE(1963) 
AVT(19873, 
19973) 
AVT(20043) 
GSK(1994, 1994) 
AVT(19823) AVT(20006) 
GSK(1984)  
Var MRK(1995) GSK(1999) 
MRK(2002) 
GSK(2002) 
AVT(2003) 
AVT(20036) 
GSK(2003) 
AVT(20036) 
GSK(2003) 
HBV GSK(1989) 
MRK(1986) 
GSK(1991) 
MRK(1987) 
AVT(2001) 
GSK(2001) 
AVT(19876, 20016) 
GSK(1994) 
AVT(20016) 
GSK(1987) 
HAV&HBV GSK(2001) GSK(1997)  GSK(1996) GSK(1996, 2002) 
HAV GSK(1995) 
MRK(1996) 
AVT(1998) 
BBT(1999) 
GSK(1995) 
MRK(1996) 
AVT(1996, 1996) 
GSK(1994) 
ISB(1999) 
AVT(1996, 19966, 
19976) 
GSK(1994) 
ISB(2003) 
AVT(19976, 
19976) 
GSK(1997) 
ISB(2000) 
HAV&Typ   AVT(2001, 2001) 
GSK(1999) 
AVT(20036, 2003) AVT(20026) 
 
Hib&HBV&Men     AVT(19996) 
Hib&HBV MRK(1996)  GSK(1996)   
Hib AVT(19937) 
MRK(1989) 
WYE(1988) 
AVT(1992) 
MRK(1997) 
AVT(1992) 
GSK(1999) 
WYE(1992) 
AVT(1992, 19926) 
GSK(1997) 
AVT(19966,8, 
19996) 
GSK(1998) 
WYE(1994) 
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Men ACWY AVT(1981) AVT(1983) AVT(1997) 
GSK(1993) 
AVT(20026)  
Men A&C AVT(1976) AVT(1993) 
GSK(1992) 
AVT(1994) AVT(1996) AVT(20006) 
Men C AVT(1975) CHR(2001) 
IDB(2001) 
WYE(2003) 
WYE(1999) 
BXT(2000) 
CHR(2000, 2001) 
AVT(20026) 
BXT(2003) 
CHR(2002) 
WYE(2002) 
AVT(20016) 
BXT(2001) 
CHR(2001) 
WYE(2000) 
Men A AVT(1975)     
Flu 
 
AVT(1947) 
CHR(1988) 
MIN(2003) 
AVT(1981,1996) 
IDB(1991) 
 
AVT(1998, 1999) 
CHR(1998, 1999, 
2001) 
GSK(1998) 
ISB(2002) 
SLV(1998, 2000, 
2004) 
AVT(1998, 1998, 
20016) 
EVN(1998) 
CHR(1998, 1999, 
2001) 
GSK(1998) 
PFM(1991) 
SLV(1998, 2000) 
AVT(19986, 
19986, 20006) 
CHR(1999, 2000) 
EVN(1996) 
ISB(2001) 
GSK(1998) 
SLV(1998, 2001, 
2004) 
BCG AVT(1998) 
ORG(1987) 
AVT(1961, 1990) 
IDB(1991, 1994) 
ORG(1995) 
SSI(2002) AVT(1976, 19786, 
1987) 
SSI(2004) 
JMF(2003) 
LIB(1992) 
1 – Acellular Pertussis 
2 – For adults 
3 – IPV 
4 – Combined with IPV 
5 – Combined with Influenza 
6 - In 1994, Merck Vaccine Division and Pasteur Mérieux Connaught (now Aventis Pasteur) formed a joint venture to market human 
vaccines in Europe and to collaborate in the development of combination vaccines for distribution. The equal shares joint venture is 
known as Aventis Pasteur MSD, S.N.C. 
7 – Combined with Tetanus Toxoid 
8- Combined with Men C 
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AVT – Aventis Pasteur 
BIK - BIKEN - The Research Foundation for Microbial Diseases, Osaka University 
BBT – Berna Biotech Ltd. 
BPT – BioPort Corporation 
BXT – Baxter Healthcare 
CHR – Chiron S.R.L. 
EVN – Evans Vaccines 
GOV – United Kingdom Department of Health  
GSK – GlaxoSmithkline Inc. 
IDB - ID Biomedical Corporation 
ISB - Istituto Sieroterapico Berna, S.r. l. 
JMF - J. M. Farmacêutica, Lda. 
LIB – Laboratorios Inibsa, S.A. 
MBL - Massachusetts Biologic Laboratories 
MIN - MedImmune Vaccines, Inc 
MRK - Merck&Co, Inc 
ORG – Organon Teknika Corporation 
PFM – Pierre Fabre Medicament 
RVL - Raúl Vieira, Lda. 
SBL – SBL Vaccine AB 
SLV – Solvay Pharma 
SSB - Swiss Serum and Vaccine Institute Berne 
SSI - Staten Serum Institute 
TKD - Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. 
WYE - Wyeth Lederle Vaccines SA 
 
  
37 
 
Table 6 – Total Doses of Flu Vaccine Produced and Distributed, by Manufacturer:  
US 2000-2009 
 
Flu 
Season 
Total # 
Doses 
Produced 
Total #  
Doses 
Distributed 
Supplier Product Doses 
Produced 
% of Total 
US Doses 
Distributed  
2000-
2001 
77.9M 70.4M Aventis 
Pasteur  
Fluzone 35MA 45% 
Wyeth Flusheild 
Pnu-Immune 
24M 31% 
MedevaB Fluvirin 20M 26% 
Parkedale Fluogen 0MC  0% 
2001-
2002 
87.7M 77.7M Aventis 
Pasteur 
Fluzone 50M 57% 
Wyeth Flushield 
Pnu-Immune 
21M  24% 
Powderject Fluvirin 17M 19% 
2002-
2003 
95.0M 83.0M Aventis 
Pasteur 
Fluzone 43ME 45% 
Wyeth Flushield 
Pnu-Immune 
21M 22% 
PowderjectD  Fluvirin 26M 27% 
2003-
2004 
86.9M 83.1M Aventis 
Pasteur 
Fluzone 43M 49% 
Chiron Fluvirin 39M 45% 
MedImmune/
Wyeth 
FluMist 5MF  6% 
2004-
2005 
61MG  57.0 M Aventis 
Pasteur 
Fluzone 58MH 95% 
Chiron Fluvirin 0MI 0% 
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MedImmune FluMist 3M 5% 
2005-
2006 
88.5M 81.5M Chiron Fluvirin 15M 17% 
GlaxoSmith
Kline 
Fluarix 7M 8% 
MedImmune FluMist 3M 3% 
Sanofi- 
PasteurJ 
Fluzone 63M 71% 
2006-
2007 
120.9M 102.5M GlaxoSmith
KlineK 
Fluarix 
FluLaval  
41M 34% 
MedImmune FluMist 3M 3% 
Novartis 
Vaccines 
Fluvirin 25.6M 21% 
Sanofi- 
PasteurJ 
Fluzone 51.3M 42% 
2007-
2008 
140.6M 112.8 M CSL Afluria 2M 1% 
GlaxoSmith
KlineK 
Fluarix 
FluLaval  
35M 25% 
MedImmune FluMist 7M 5% 
Novartis 
Vaccines 
Fluvirin 46M 33% 
Sanofi- 
PasteurJ 
Fluzone 50M 36% 
2008-
2009 
135.9M 113 M CSL Afluria 8.1M 6% 
GlaxoSmith
KlineK 
Fluarix 
FluLaval  
43.5M 32% 
MedImmune FluMist 6.8M 5% 
Novartis 
Vaccines 
Fluvirin 27.2M 20% 
Sanofi- 
PasteurJ 
Fluzone 50.3M 37% 
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A: Includes 9M contracted later in the season by the CDC, of which only 2M were ever 
administered 
B: Medeva was purchased by Celltech in January 2000 and in turn sold to Powderject shortly after 
C: Faced cGMP violations and production was suspended. Parkedale had planned to distribute 
12M doses  
D: Powderject was purchased by Chiron in July 2003 
E: 43M doses were already distributed as of October 31, 2002. There is no data available for entire 
season. 
F: Only 450,000 doses of the 5M were ever administered 
G: 100M doses were originally planned before Chiron’s production was suspended 
H: Only 50M planned, but Aventis pledged 8M additional doses to help alleviate shortage caused 
by  Chiron’s manufacturing problems 
I: Production suspended by UK regulatory authorities. Chiron had planned to distribute 46M to 
48M doses 
J: Previously Aventis Pasteur  
K: The license belongs to ID Biomedical Corp of Quebec, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
GlaxoSmithKline. 
* Individual manufacturer production values may not add up to total production values due to 
rounding 
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Table 7 - Production Time for Egg-based vs. Cell-based Influenza Vaccine 
 
Process Egg-based Cell culture based 
Seed prep 2-8months 1-2months 
Substrate availability 0-3months 0-0.5months 
Facilities Open system Closed system 
Timely availability 
pandemic vaccine 
(-) (+) 
Source: National Influenza Summit: May 2003 “Vaccine Production Using Cell Culture” Solvay 
Pharmaceuticals 
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Table 8 - Major WHO Approved Global Manufacturers of Inactivated Influenza Vaccine 
Producer  Country  Brand name  
Medimmune-Avirion  USA  FluMist  
Baxter-- Immuno AG  Austria Czech Republic  
 
CSL  Australia  Fluvax  
GSK  Belgium  FluarixNH Fluarix SH  
Butantan (Filler)  Brazil  Gripe Vaccine  
Sanofi Pasteur  France   
Mutagrip Vaxigrip 
Tetagrip  
USA  Fluozone  
Novartis  Germany  Fluad  
Italy  Antigripal S1  
UK  Fluvirin Evagrip  
Denka Seiken Co, Ltd  Japan  Influenza Seiken HA  
Chemo-Sero-
Therapeutic Research 
Institute  
Japan  Influenza Kaketsuken HA  
Kitasato Institute  Japan  Influenza HA  
Biken Japan Influenza Biken 
Dong Shin 
Pharmaceuticals 
(Filler)  
Korea  Dong Shin Influenza HA  
Korea Vaccine Co. Ltd 
(Filler)  Korea  Influ-kovax  
Korea Green Cross 
(Filler)  Korea  Inflexal V  
Solvay Healthcare  Netherlands  Influvac  
Cantacuzino Institute  Romania  
VACCIN GRIPAL 
TRIVALENT, 
PURIFICAT ªI 
INACTIVAT  
Immunopreparat 
Research productive 
association, Ufa  
Russia  
Influenza Vaccine  
Products 
Immunologicals and 
Drugs. Irkustk  
Influenza Vaccine  
RIVS, Saint 
Petersburg  Influenza Vaccine  
Berna -Crucell  Switzerland  Inflexal V, Vitagrip, Fluviral  
ID Biomedical  Canada  FluInsure  
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Wyeth Lederle  USA  Flushield  
Torlak Institute  Serbia&Montenegro  Vaccinum Influenzae   
Zhejiang Tianyuan - 
BioPharmaceutical 
Co. Ltd  
China  
Influenza  
Sinovac Kexing 
Biological Product Co., 
Ltd  
AnFlu TM  
Beijing Institute of 
Biological Products 
(BIBP)  
Influenza  
Shanghai Institute of 
Biological Products 
(SIBP)  
Influenza  
Changchun Institute of 
Biological Products 
(CCIBP)  
Influenza  
Changchun 
Changsheng Life 
Sciences Ltd  
Influenza  
Lanzhou Institute of 
Biological Products 
(LIBP)  
Influenza  
Shenzhen-Sanofi 
Pasteur (Filler)  Influenza  
Changzhou Yanshen 
Biotechnology 
Co., Ltd 
Influenza  
Liaoning Tiancheng 
Bio-pharmacy Insitute 
Co. Ltd  
Influenza  
Omninvest Ltd.   Hungary  Influenza  
SOURCES: World Health Organization: “Influenza Vaccine Manufacturers”, 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/Influenza_vaccine_manufacturers2009_05.pdf;  
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Figure 1 – Entry and Exit of Vaccine Products (FDA-approved Licenses) 1901-2001
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Figure 2 -  Predicted Number of Competitors as a Function of Years of Market Existence 
Note: Direct Competitors is the number of licensed vaccines of exactly the same 
type in year t that are owned by other producers. All Competitors is the sum of 
Direct Competitors plus other licensed vaccines that include the vaccine in 
question in year t, including combination vaccines. 
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1 This is true particularly for traditional pediatric vaccines against highly infectious diseases, such as polio, measles, 
etc. In general, the cost-effectiveness of any specific vaccine depends on the price, the target population and the 
measure of effectiveness. This analysis does not distinguish between pediatric and adult vaccines, because the 
analysis applies to all types.  
2 Institute of Medicine (2004); GAO (2002). 
3 S. Jarrett, “Procurement Strategies for Drugs and Vaccines,” Wharton Impact Conference on Pharmaceutical 
Innovation in a Global Economy (4-5 October 2002). 
4 Mercer Management Consulting (2002), http://www.vaccinealliance.org/Support_to_Country/vpp/index.php. Basic 
pediatric vaccines include measles, mumps, rubella, diptheria, TB, pertussis, polio, tetanus, typhoid etc. These older 
vaccines are part of pediatric vaccination schedules in most countries, with financing for the poorest countries 
through the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI).  
5 USAToday 8/13/2010. http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2010-08-13-vaccines_N.htm (last 
accessed 9/13/2010). 
6 Government recommendation may increase coverage by private insurance as well as public programs. 
7 States handle enrolment of eligible patients and eligible doctors, who receive free vaccine for these patients. 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/parents/default.htm#history. Last accessed 12/16/2010. 
8 Jarrett, “Procurement Strategies for Drugs and Vaccines.” 
9 Thimerosal is a mercury-containing preservative that was used in multi-dose vaccine vials that has been alleged to 
be associated with autism.  
10 R&D cost for vaccines is estimated to be comparable to other drugs (Grabowski, 2005). Vaccine production 
requires unusually high investments in quality assurance, as a condition of getting and maintaining the plant license. 
Fixed costs have been estimated at 60 percent of total production costs and semi-fixed batch costs at an additional 
25percent (Mercer, 2002). 
11 Combinations are usually produced by the producer(s) of the component parts.  
12 If a vaccine produces adverse effects, many patients are likely to be affected. The risks associated with individual 
vaccine doses are therefore correlated, not independent, as required for diversification and insurability.  
13 The assumption that each firm sets its price and customers choose quantities characterizes the CDC procurement 
process. It is also a plausible model of private purchasing in which buyers negotiate price discounts from competing 
suppliers.  
14 The pertussis component is usually not given to adults because whooping cough is less severe in older people 
while the vaccine side effects may be more severe. Patients also receive diphtheria and tetanus boosters every ten 
years. Nidus Information Services Inc., “What are the Vaccines for Diphtheria, Tetanus, and Pertussis?” 
http://www.nym.org/healthinfo/docs/090/doc90diphtheria.html (15 November 2004). 
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